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Fischer: RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-Compelling Defendant in Criminal Case
to speak as Means of Identification-Held, Unconstitutional
and Inadmissible as Evidence.-In the recent case of State v.
Taylor,' the South Carolina Supreme Court was again confronted with the question of the admissibility of testimony
under Article 1, Section 17 of the South CarolinaState Con-

stitution of 1895. The pertinent part of aforesaid section reads
as follows: ... "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself

.

.

".

Defendant in the recent case of State v. Taylor, while being
held as a suspect on a charge of rape, was compelled, along
with four other prisoners, to stand with his back to the prosecuting witness and repeat certain words said by assailant to
the prosecuting witness at the time of the crime. Prosecuting
witness then identified defendant by his voice as her assailant.
At the trial, a deputy sheriff who had witnessed the procedure
was allowed to testify as to the above transactions. HELDThis was a violation of Article 1, Section 17, Constitution of
1895.
In South Carolina, the law is settled that under no circumstances can a defendant be compelled to testify against himself.2 This applies not only to courts of law but also to examinations before any tribunal or other body that has power to
subpoena and compel attendance of witnesses, including hearings before a legislative investigating committee that has been
given plenary powers to compel testimony. 3 However, it is not
always clear as to what evidence falls within that privilege.
While the precise point raised in the principal case is one of
first impression in this state, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina has held that many other forms of evidence come
S. C......... 49 S. E. 2d 289 (1948).
1.........
2. State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81, 82, 35 A. L. R. 1227
(1923).
3. In Re Hearing Before Joint Legislative Committee, 187 S. C. 1,
196 S. E. 164 (1938).
4. State v. Griffin supra, note 2.
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within the privilege. In the leading case 4 in this state on the
question of self-crimination, it was held that it was permissible
for a sheriff to take a defendant's shoe and place it in a track
in order to prove that defendant had been near the scene of
the crime. Testimony as to the similarity of the tracks and
the shoes was admitted. It was held, however, that the defendant could not be compelled to walk in the tracks in order to
establish the similarity nor was it admissible to show that defendant refused to properly place her foot in the tracks. In this
case the Court laid down the rule which is followed in South
Carolina when it HELD, inter ala.: A defendant in a criminal
case cannot be compelled to testify against himself under any
circumstances; the line of cleavage being whether the proposed evidence is defendant's testimony, or evidence in itself,
unaided by any statement of defendant. Again in State v,.
GreenP evidence of the similarity of defendant's shoes and
tracks outside a window was not admitted when it was shown
that defendant had been compelled to place his feet in the
tracks for the purpose of comparison. It has also been held
that evidence obtained by compelling a defendant to run or
walk in a certain manner for the purpose of identification is
inadmissible. 6 However, in a recent case it was held that compelling a defendant to stand up in the court room for the
purpose of identification is not in violation of Article 1, Section
7
17 of the South CarolinaConstitution of 1895.
In the United States there are only two other cases which
decide the precise point presented in the principal case. In
Johnson v. Commonwealth,8 the exception relating to this
point was dismissed upon the ground that the request to introduce this evidence was acceded to by both defendant and
his counsel and therefore was never passed upon by the
Pennsylvania Court. The other case, 9 a Texas decision, held on
identical facts with the principal case that the testimony could
not be admitted.
The privilege which is embodied in Article 1, Section 17 of
the South Carolina Constitution is likewise embodied in the
5.

121 S. C. 230, 113 S. E. 317 (1922).

6. State v. Atldnson, 40 S. C. 363, 18 S. E. 1021 (1893).
7. State v. O'Neal et al, 210 S. C. 305, 42 S. E. 2d 523 (1947).
8. 115 Pa.St. 369, 9 A. 78, 81 (1887).
9. Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. R. 272, 162 S. W. 2d 706, 709
(1942).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss2/7

2

REVIEW Fischer:
SECTIONRECENT CASES

Federal Constitution and the constitutions of forty-five other
states. However, the decisions of the courts as to its scope
and purpose are widely divergent and often conflicting. The
theories on the privilege seem to range from those few courts
which hold "... that the privilege as to self-crimination relates
only to oral or written testimonial utterances, and not to any
other physical acts or exhibitions even though such acts or exhibitions, required of a defendant on his trial, constitute or
disclose evidence tending to incriminate him (see particularly
State v. Ah Chuey, (1879), 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530), to
the apparent position that the privilege protects the defendant
from being required to perform any affirmative act whatever
during his trial (aside from being present in court) which
would serve as evidence against him. See Smith v. State,
(1946), 247 Ala. 354, 24 So. 2d 546. These represent the extreme views taken, and most of the cases have not gone so far
in either direction . . -.10
The author of the annotation in 171 A. L. R. 1144 divides
the privilege into three categories, to wit: (1) where the defendant has not become a witness against himself; (2) on the
cross examination of a defendant who has testified in his own
behalf; and (3) where the defendant is making a common-law
or statutory statement to the jury. The author discusses a
possible fourth class in the notes which is where the defendant
before the trial is required to perform certain acts which are
witnessed by some one and then testified to by this party on
the trial. In a general summary of the law in each classification the author states that under classification number (1) the
courts generally hold that the defendant must come to court,
except in some misdemeanors, sit in view of the jury, and this
requires the defendant to be in view of the witness. The courts
usually will allow the defendant to perform such acts as will
enable witnesses and jury to.have a clear view of such portions of his person or attire as are customarily open to public
view. Under heading number (2) it is'generally held that when
a defendant takes the witness stand in his own behalf, he
thereby subjects himself to the same rules which govern other
witnesses. Since the practice classified under number (3) is
employed in only a few jurisdictions and there are only a few
cases in point, it is sufficient to say that there is a diversity of
10. 171 A. L. R. 1152.
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opinion as to what is admissible under the privilege. While
these classifications may be helpful in justifying many of the
decisions, no judicial authority has been found for it. South
Carolina and the majority of the jurisdictions weigh the
merits of each individual case in determining the admissibility
of the evidence under this privilege.
The Federal Courts, in accord with Mr. Wigmore, hold that
the privilege extends only to testimonial utterances and writings and does not include acts by defendant n
In the principal case, the South Carolina Supreme Court
went a long way in extending the privilege granted by Article
1, Section 17. However, the decision seems to be sound and in
accord with the rule laid down in State v'. Griffin, supra.
SIDNEY B. JONES, JR.

DIVORCE-Full Faith and Credit Clause of U. S. Constitution-Validity of a Foreign Divorce Decree.-On August 4,
1944, respondent filed a bill of complaint for divorce in the
Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the State of
Florida. The complaint alleged extreme cruelty as grounds for
divorce, and also alleged that the respondent was a bona fide
resident of the State of Florida. In this divorce proceeding,
appellant retained Florida counsel, who entered a general appearance, and on September 4, 1944, filed an answer denying
the allegations of respondent's complaint, including the allegation as to respondent's Florida domicile, and demanding
strict proof thereof. Throughout the entire proceedings, and
at all of the hearings, the appellant was present and was represented by counsel, and contested the case. Respondent introduced evidence to substantiate the allegations of his complaint, based upon cruelty, and'to establish his Florida domi-

cile. Counsel for appellant had full opportunity to cross examine respondent and his witnesses, and to introduce evidence
in rebuttal. The circuit court of Florida, on March 12, 1945,
entered a final decree of divorce after specifically finding
"... that it has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties to this cause." More than two years later, on July 15,
11. Holt v. United States, 219 U. S. 245, 252, 31 S. Ct. 2 (1910),
Wigmore on Evidence See. 2263, pp. 863, 864.
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1947, appellant instituted the present action against respondent in the circuit court of Richland County. In this action she
asks the court to declare the Florida divorce decree invalid for
lack of jurisdiction. The respondent filed a demurrer to the
complaint, which was sustained. HELD, on appeal, that the
divorce proceeding in Florida was valid, and was not the subject of collateral attack because the divorce decree was rendered in a case in which appellant appeared in person and by
counsel, and not only contested the case but demanded and
received in that Court affirmative relief. Under such circumstances, the Florida Court's jurisdiction was held to be un. C. .. , 49 S. E. 2d 570
assailable. Kahn v. Kahn,
(1948).
The question of whether or not a divorce decree granted
by the courts of one state can be collaterally attacked in the
courts of a sister state has been the subject of considerable
comment and prolific litigation. Many of the discordant decisions regarding this matter can be traced to the diversity of
facts which have been the basis for the original suits. The
present question is of particular concern to the courts of South
Carolina, because of its peculiar position as the one remaining
State which has not yet provided for legalized divorces.'
Any attempt to impeach a divorce decree in a proceeding,
the purpose of which is not to annul or cancel the decree, is
considered as a collateral attack thereon. In re Hurter, 181 N.
Y. S. 75, 111 Misc. 85 (1920). Generally, a judgment which is
conclusive in the state where rendered must be given full
credit in the courts of another state in a suit between the same
parties or their privies, with regard to an issue which was
determined in the former proceeding. Scheper v. Scheper, 125
S. C. 89, 118 S. E. 178 (1923). A decree, however; which is
void for lack of jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked. State
v. Westmoreland, 76 S. C. 145, 56 S. E. 673 (1906). When the
collateral attack is allowed, all reasonable intendments and
presumptions are taken in favor of the decree sought to be
impeached. Schulze v. Schulze, 149 Ga. 532, 101 S. E. 183
(1919).

1. Art. 17, Sec. 3, South Carolina Constitution of 1895: "Divorces
from the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed in this State."
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Art. 4, sec. 1, of the Federal Constitution2 requires that
judicial proceedings in every state shall be given full faith and
credit in the courts of sister states. The Act of May 26, 1790,
1 Stat. at L. 122, chap. 11, as amended, Rev. Stat., see. 905,
28 U. S. C. A. sec. 697, declares that the judicial proceedings,
properly authenticated, shall be given such faith and credit in
every ". . . court within the United States as they have by
law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are
taken." Hence Congress interpreted this portion of the Constitution to mean not partial credit but full credit. Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U. S. 567, 50 L. Ed. 868, 26 S. Ct. 525, 5 Ann.
Cas. 1 (1905). It is one thing to allow a court to re-examine a
finding of jurisdiction when the question was previously determined in ex-parte proceedings as in Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 89 L. Ed. 1577, 157 A. L. R. 1366
(1944). It is quite another thing to permit the same court to
cast aside the findings of a court in a sister state where both
parties appeared, the question of domicile was contested, and
the highest requirements of due process were fully complied
with. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 83 L. Ed. 26, 118 A. L. R.
1518 (1938).
An examination of the case of Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U. S. 14, 47 L. Ed. 366, 23 S. Ct. 237 (1902), will reveal a decision which appears to be contra to the holding in the Kahn
case, supra. However, that decision was rendered prior to the
modern development of the law with respect to finality of
judicial proceedings. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 92 Law Ed., Adv.
Ops., 1055, 68 S. Ct. 1087, (decided June 7, 1948).
The principle issue decided in the Kahn case is not one
which has been dealt with by South Carolina courts previously. The well known divorce cases in South Carolina, (McCreery
v. Davis, 44 S.C. 195,22 S. E. 178 (1894) ; Scheper v. Scheper,
125 S. C. 89, 117 S. E. 178 (1923) ; State v. Watmoreland, 76
S. C. 145, 56 S. E. 673 (1906); State v. Duncan, 110 S. C.
253, 96 S.E. 294 (1918), and the very recent case of Nimmer's
Estate v. Nimmer, 212 S.C. 311, 47 S. E. 2d 715 (1948) were
all concerned with actions in which only one party appeared
and in which the question of domicile was not contested.
2. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
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The most difficult question presented by this decision is,
will an interested third party be precluded from attacking the
holding of the foreign jurisdiction to the same extent as the
litigating parties? The problem was not dealt with squarely,
nevertheless, by implication, it seems that the court went
further than to merely decide the rights of the individuals.
This is not a situation in which a State and its power to control its domiciliaries are the sole factors. This is, rather, a
case in which two States of the Federal Union must construe
their respective powers in the light of the Federal Constitution. Chief Justice Vinson concluded his opinion in the Sherrer
case, supra, by saying:
"And where a decree of divorce is rendered by a competent court under the circumstances of this case, the obligation of full faith and credit requires that such litigation
should end in the courts of the State in which the judgment
was rendered." However this decision might be interpreted
in the future, the conflict of authority bearing upon it illustrates the necessity for enactment of uniform divorce laws
in each of the forty-eight states.
GEORGE H. FISCHER
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